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THE CUBAN CONUNDRUM: PROPOSING AN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK REGISTRY FOR 
WELL-KNOWN FOREIGN MARKS 
INTRODUCTION 
[A]voidance of consumer confusion is the ultimate end of all 
trademark law.1 
Wealthy tourists who possess an affinity for slot machines, blackjack, and 
roulette may be familiar with the Casino de Monte Carlo. Since 1863, the 
casino, operating under its namesake trademark,2 has promoted the allure of 
Monaco. The casino’s trademark is registered in Monaco, but not in the United 
States.3 Seizing upon the lack of a U.S. trademark registration, operators of 
online gambling websites developed software that exhibited pictures of the 
Casino de Monte Carlo’s interior and exterior and alluded to Monte Carlo’s 
distinctive geographical location, relying on the casino’s noteworthy features 
to advertise their own online products.4 The owners of the Casino de Monte 
Carlo trademark challenged this use of the mark when they became aware of 
these potentially infringing web sites.5 In International Bancorp, LLC v. 
Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, the Fourth 
Circuit determined whether a foreign trademark unregistered in the United 
States could still receive protection from infringement.6 
In analyzing the dispute, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, for the use of an 
unregistered mark in foreign trade to merit Lanham Act protection,7 the mark 
must be distinctive among U.S. consumers.8 The court determined that, even 
 
 1 Int’l Bancorp LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 
381 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 2 Id. at 361. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 385 (“Until today, every court to address this issue has held that use of a foreign trademark in 
connection with goods and services sold only in a foreign country by a foreign entity does not constitute ‘use 
of the mark’ in United States commerce sufficient to merit protection.” (emphasis in original)). 
 7 The Lanham Act governs trademark law in the United States. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006). The 
test for trademark infringement is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).  
 8 Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 363 (citing Sara Lee Corp v. Kasyer-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 
1996)) (finding that the degree of protection received by a mark is directly related to its level of 
distinctiveness). 
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without a demonstrated connection to use within the United States, a foreign 
mark deemed “famous” should be protected because trademark laws are 
designed to minimize consumer confusion.9 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit 
held that the online gambling websites infringed the Monte Carlo casino’s 
trademark because the use of similar domain addresses and pictures of the 
actual casino would cause confusion among ordinary consumers.10 
In an analogous fashion to how Monaco’s noteworthy casino has helped 
bring fame to the principality, Cuba has achieved renown for its popular brands 
of rum and cigars. While Cuba’s products are distinctive among the cigar-
smoking and rum-imbibing segments of the public, the U.S. court system has 
failed to provide Cuban trademarks with the same protections as the Casino de 
Monte Carlo in Monaco.11 The reason for this dissimilar treatment may be that 
Monaco possesses an open trading relationship with the United States,12 while 
Cuba has been considered an adversary for five decades.13 
The lack of protection for well-known Cuban marks stems from the trade 
embargo between the United States and Cuba.14 Both nations are members of 
treaties that embody international intellectual property principles,15 but U.S. 
courts have consistently ruled that U.S. domestic law codifying the embargo 
outweighs the treaty obligations of the United States in conforming to 
international intellectual property law.16 Realizing that Cuban marks tied to 
Castro’s communist government face strict restrictions in the United States, 
companies such as Bacardi and General Cigar have seized on this opening in 
 
 9 Id. at 381. 
 10 Id. at 381–82. 
 11 Compare Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005), with Int’l 
Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 381. 
 12 The principality of Monaco encompasses less than one square mile, but became known for Hollywood 
glamour after actress Grace Kelly married Prince Rainier in 1956. Principality of Monaco, NATIONS ONLINE, 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/monaco (last visited Mar. 17, 2011). Monaco also was known as a tax 
haven where clients could place their assets to evade taxes in their home country, but the principality recently 
adopted international standards for banking openness after pressure from the United States and Europe. See 
David Jolly, As Tax Havens Acquiesce, Monaco Adopts Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/03/16/business/worldbusiness/16haven.html. 
 13 The Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2011) (codifying the trade embargo against 
Cuba).  
 14 Id. 
 15 See discussion of the Paris Convention and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2. 
 16 See, e.g., Empresa Cubana del Tabaco, 399 F.3d at 476–77 (finding that granting the injunctive relief 
sought would effect a transfer of property rights to a Cuban entity in violation of the embargo, and that this 
limitation on judicial authority applies to Lanham Act and Paris Convention claims). 
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the marketplace and trademarked their own versions of Havana Club rum and 
Cohiba cigars.17 When the United States lifts the trade embargo with Cuba, 
trademark questions regarding several of these disputed marks will remain.18 
The analysis of the U.S.-Cuba trademark disputes can provide guidance for 
the future in weighing how a country should balance its international politics 
with its obligations under intellectual property law. This Comment argues that 
countries set a dangerous precedent when they rely on temporary political 
considerations to block well-known foreign trademarks or interfere with 
internationally agreed-upon intellectual property rights. This Comment 
searches for a feasible solution that would prevent a country from violating 
international intellectual property treaties by registering its own version of a 
well-known foreign mark—thus leading to consumer confusion about the 
source and origin of the mark—simply because a political relationship has 
deteriorated between the country of registration and the country of the foreign 
mark’s origin. Because avoidance of consumer confusion is the ultimate 
purpose of trademark law, this Comment advocates for an international, 
centralized registration system for well-known foreign trademarks. This 
international registry would provide protection for well-known foreign marks 
in a worldwide marketplace and not subject the marks to retaliatory actions 
during wars, embargoes, or other conflicts. 
First, in Part I, this Comment analyzes relevant trademark law in discussing 
how a mark achieves the “well-known” status that entitles it to enhanced 
protection under international law based on intellectual property principles. 
The Comment also examines recent attempts to provide well-known marks 
with greater international protection and describes the European Union’s 
innovative trademark approach. Next, Part II explores the two most famous 
trademark disputes of the past decade between the United States and Cuba. The 
analysis explains how U.S. courts relied on domestic law rather than on 
international intellectual property treaties in ruling on the disputes—a decision-
making process that could be the subject of scrutiny once the current trade 
embargo between the two nations ends. In Part III, this Comment addresses the 
implications of applying a separate standard to well-known trademarks 
 
 17 See id. at 476 (focusing on the dispute over registration of the Cohiba mark for cigars); Havana Club 
Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 119–22 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing the history of the disputed 
Havana Club rum mark). 
 18 See Will Weissert & Michael Felderbaum, Trademark Wars: US Goods Carry Famous Cuba Brands, 
MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/PubArticleDBR.jsp?id= 
1202465773636&hbxlogin=1. 
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originating in Cuba, and discusses how this approach places the United States 
at odds with other countries. Finally, this Comment assesses how adding a 
proposed amendment calling for international trademark registration to the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement19 
would affect the ongoing U.S.-Cuba trademark controversy. 
I. WELL-KNOWN MARKS: LEVELS OF PROTECTION AT HOME AND 
INTERNATIONALLY 
A. An Exception to the Territoriality Principle Within the United States? 
The territoriality principle serves as an important tenet of trademark law by 
providing that a trademark maintains a separate existence in every country 
where it is registered.20 The doctrine allows each country to determine its own 
statutory scheme for applying trademark rights.21 In the United States, 
exclusive trademark rights can be claimed only through priority of use under 
the Lanham Act, which means that the mark must be used in conjunction with 
the sale of goods or performance of services within the United States’s 
borders.22 Foreign use generally is not sufficient to establish priority of use 
within the United States.23 The priority of trademark rights in the United 
States, therefore, does not rely on priority of use anywhere in the world.24 
The well-known marks doctrine, however, serves as an exception to the 
rule that only priority of use establishes trademark rights within the United 
States. In his treatise on trademark law, Professor J. Thomas McCarthy defines 
the well-known marks doctrine as follows: “If a mark used only on products or 
services sold abroad is so famous that its reputation is known in the United 
States, then that mark should be legally recognized in the United States.”25 
 
 19 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 20 See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004); 5 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:2, at 29-7 to -10 (4th ed. 
2008). 
 21 See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:3, at 29-12 (citing Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 
1568–59 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 22 See Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that mere advertising of a foreign 
trademark in the United States did not constitute use in commerce under the Lanham Act). 
 23 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:3, at 29-11. 
 24 Id. § 29:2, at 29-7; see also Person’s Co., 900 F.2d at 1568 (finding that relying on use of a mark in 
Japan in an attempt to support a claim for priority of use in the United States does not establish priority of use 
because foreign use has no effect on U.S. commerce). 
 25 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:4, at 29-14. 
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Thus, in rare cases, a trademark can receive protection even if the mark has 
failed to be used in commerce within the borders of the United States. This 
Subpart contrasts two recent cases where courts gave more credence to the 
well-known marks doctrine with the typical determination that the doctrine 
does not exist under federal law. 
1. Protection for Well-Known Foreign Marks 
Two recent cases have shed new light on the well-known marks doctrine, 
as both holdings oppose the majority rule that the well-known marks doctrine 
does not exist as a matter of federal law. In De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. 
DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc.,26 the plaintiff used its trademark for more 
than a century in connection with the diamond business, adopting the slogan 
“A Diamond Is Forever” for advertising purposes.27 The plaintiff alleged 
trademark infringement when the defendants registered thirty-four Internet 
domain names that included the words “De Beers” and also registered the 
namesake mark for use in purchasing diamonds.28 The defendants argued that 
the plaintiff had not used the mark in commerce in the United States;29 
however, the plaintiff asserted that the mark had achieved the requisite level of 
fame within the United States to be entitled to the protection of the well-known 
marks doctrine.30 The plaintiffs alleged that, under the Lanham Act Section 
43(a), the defendants’ use of the mark served as a “false or misleading” 
description of fact that would be likely to “cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive . . . as to the origin, sponsorship or approval  
of . . . goods.”31 
 
 26 De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4099 (DLC), 2005 WL 
1164073 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005). 
 27 Id. at *1. 
 28 Id. at *2. 
 29 Id. at *6. De Beers had failed to establish itself in the United States because of a decades-long antitrust 
case where the diamond producer was accused of price-fixing and other anticompetitive conduct. See Stephen 
Labaton, De Beers Agrees to Guilty Plea to Re-enter the U.S. Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/10/business/de-beers-agrees-to-guilty-plea-to-re-enter-the-us-market.html. 
After facing antitrust cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1945, 1957, and 1974, De Beers left 
the American market and resorted to using intermediaries to bring its diamonds into the country. Id. Because 
the company based its operations overseas, the Justice Department had no jurisdiction and was unable to 
continue its price-fixing prosecution. Id. However, in July 2004, De Beers agreed to plead guilty to criminal 
price-fixing, a move that could potentially pave the way for the company to return to the United States. Id. 
 30 De Beers, 2005 WL 1164073, at *6. 
 31 Id.; see also Lanham Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
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In its decision, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
noted that a split in authority existed as to whether the well-known marks 
doctrine applied in U.S. federal courts.32 The Second Circuit has not yet 
recognized the well-known marks doctrine, as the court has read the federal 
statute to require “use in commerce” for an unregistered trademark in which a 
plaintiff claims a protectable interest.33 However, the District Court decided to 
apply the well-known marks doctrine in the De Beers case, calling the doctrine 
“a narrow but justified exception to the territoriality principle.”34 The court 
cited policy implications in holding that the doctrine should be applied in the 
De Beers case as long as the mark had achieved an appropriate level of fame.35 
The court saw the need to protect a legitimate foreign-owned business from 
having its trademarks usurped by “pirates” who rush to register an existing 
mark on their own goods.36 According to the court, this usurpation of goodwill 
could pose a particular problem as international commerce increases. The court 
stated: “Recognition of the famous marks doctrine is particularly desirable in a 
world where international travel is commonplace and where the Internet and 
other media facilitate the rapid creation of business goodwill that transcends 
borders.”37 
In Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
became the only federal circuit court to apply the well-known marks 
doctrine.38 The Ninth Circuit examined whether the mark “Gigante,” which a 
chain of grocery stores in Mexico used for several decades,39 had achieved a 
sufficient level of fame among Mexican-Americans in California to give the 
mark protection in the United States.40 Although the Mexican store’s mark had 
 
 32 De Beers, 2005 WL 1164073, at *8 (“There is little case law on the famous marks doctrine from 
federal courts generally, and the cases that exist vary in their conclusions . . . . Only one federal circuit has 
applied the doctrine to date.”). 
 33 Id. at *7 (citing Buti, 139 F.3d at 102–03) (applying the use-in-commerce inquiry to a foreign entity 
seeking trademark protection in the United States and finding that, under Lanham Act Section 43(a), a party 
must establish prior use and ownership to prove its trademark is entitled to protection). 
 34 De Beers, 2005 WL 1164073, at *8. 
 35 Id. at *8–9 (holding that it remains a question of fact whether De Beers’s namesake trademark has 
achieved the requisite level of the fame in the United States to qualify as a famous mark and merit protection). 
 36 Id. at *8. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004); see also ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 
135, 159 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the only federal appeals court to have 
recognized the famous marks doctrine as a matter of federal law.”); De Beers, 2005 WL 1164073, at *8. 
 39 See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V., 391 F.3d at 1091. The court stated that Grupo Gigante had almost 
100 stores in Mexico by 1991. Id. 
 40 Id. at 1091–93. 
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never been used in commerce in the United States,41 the store asserted its 
trademark rights under the well-known marks doctrine when a San Diego-
based store attempted to use the same “Gigante” mark.42 In holding for the 
plaintiff, the court ruled that, to qualify as a well-known mark, a trademark 
must have obtained more than just “secondary meaning” in the relevant 
market; instead, the mark must be recognized by a substantial number of 
persons within that market.43 In explaining the well-known marks exception to 
the customary rule of territoriality, the Ninth Circuit held: 
While the territoriality principle is a long-standing and important 
doctrine within trademark law, it cannot be absolute. An absolute 
territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception44 would promote 
consumer confusion and fraud. Commerce crosses borders. In this 
nation of immigrants, so do people. Trademark is, at its core, about 
protecting against consumer confusion.45 
According to the holdings in De Beers and Grupo Gigante, a trademark from a 
foreign country—regardless of use within the U.S. borders—can be enforced 
within the United States if the mark reaches well-known status due to its 
reputation and established goodwill, even if the mark has never been used in 
commerce or registered within the country.46 In Grupo Gigante, the Ninth 
Circuit expounded on other factors that courts should consider in determining 
whether a mark is well known. The court considered whether the defendant 
intentionally copied the mark and the likelihood of consumer confusion in the 
United States if a reasonable number of consumers expected they were buying 
the product connected with the mark’s foreign owner rather than the new 
domestic product.47 However, acceptance of the well-known marks doctrine as 
an exception to the territoriality principle as a matter of federal law remains 
primarily limited to the foregoing cases. 
 
 41 Id. at 1091. 
 42 Id. “Gigante Market” opened two locations in San Diego, the first in 1991 and the second store in 
1996. Id. 
 43 Id. at 1093–94.  
 44 Courts often refer interchangeably to the “famous marks” doctrine and the “well-known” marks 
doctrine. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:61, at 29-204. 
 45 Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V., 391 F.3d at 1094. 
 46 Id. at 1094–95; De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. V. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4099 
(DLC), 2005 WL 1164073, at *7–9 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:61, at 
29-204. 
 47 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098 (finding that the factors are relevant to determining whether a mark 
is well known because “they bear heavily on the risks of consumer confusion and fraud, which are the reasons 
for having a famous-mark exception”); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:4, at 29-15 to -16 & n.5. 
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2. No Federal Protection for Well-Known Foreign Marks 
Despite the holdings in the two preceding cases, a majority of courts in the 
United States have ruled that the well-known marks doctrine does not exist as a 
matter of federal law and such marks should only receive state law 
protection.48 In 2007, the Second Circuit examined the U.S. trademark 
registration of “Bukhara” for a restaurant in the case of ITC Ltd. v. 
Punchgini.49 The mark was associated with an international chain of Indian 
restaurants, which some magazines reviewed as the best Indian dining 
establishments in the world.50 However, a dispute existed about whether ITC, 
the corporation that owned the international chain of restaurants, had 
abandoned its rights to the mark in the United States when the New York City 
and Chicago restaurants bearing the mark closed.51 The defendants 
subsequently opened their own version of the restaurant and attempted to use 
the trademark “Bukhara Grill.”52 The court noted “numerous similarities 
suggestive of deliberate copying”53 between the international Bukhara 
restaurants operated by ITC and the new establishment. The plaintiffs brought 
an infringement suit and argued they retained the trademark rights because the 
mark had achieved sufficient worldwide renown, even if the mark had been 
abandoned within the United States following the closure of the two dining 
establishments in New York and Chicago.54 
In rejecting the plaintiff’s claims, the Second Circuit analyzed specific 
Lanham Act provisions dealing with registered marks and found that the Act 
never references the well-known marks doctrine.55 The court found that the 
 
 48 See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 159 (2d Cir. 2007); see also De Beers, 2005 WL 
1164073, at *8 (finding that the Ninth Circuit is the only federal circuit court to apply the famous marks 
doctrine to date); Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) 
(suggesting that recognition of the famous marks doctrine derives from state common law, based on a theory 
of unfair competition or misappropriation, and not from the Lanham Act or other federal law). 
 49 Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 135. 
 50 See id. at 143. In 2002 and 2003, the Bukhara restaurant in New Delhi was named one of the world’s 
fifty best restaurants by London’s Restaurant magazine. See id. 
 51 Id. The Manhattan restaurant closed in 1991 and the Chicago restaurant closed in 1997. Id. ITC 
conceded that “it has not owned, operated or licensed any restaurant in the United States” bearing the 
“Bukhara” mark since the Chicago restaurant closed. Id. 
 52 Id. at 144. 
 53 Id. The court found that, in addition to the similar name, Bukhara Grill mimicked the original Bukhara 
restaurant’s logo, décor, staff uniforms, menus, and customer bibs. Id. 
 54 Id. at 142, 154. ITC argued that it had continuously used the Bukhara mark outside the United States 
since 1977 and that the mark had achieved renown inside the United States even before it opened two 
restaurants in New York and Chicago. Id. at 154. 
 55 Id. at 164. 
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“absence of any statutory provision expressly incorporating the famous marks 
doctrine . . . is all the more significant”56 because Congress has made its intent 
known through a multitude of amendments to the Lanham Act but never 
specifically addressed well-known marks.57 Although the Ninth Circuit 
justified the famous marks doctrine as a matter of sound policy in Grupo 
Gigante, the Second Circuit held that it could not deviate from the “basic 
principle of territoriality” without congressional action amending the Lanham 
Act to provide for a well-known marks exception.58 Therefore, the court 
reasoned, even though the “Bukhara” mark had attained significant use in 
commerce abroad, the plaintiff’s failure to use the mark within the United 
States allowed the owners of the newer Bukhara Grill restaurant to obtain 
priority rights in the mark at home.59 Other courts within the Second Circuit 
also have rejected the view that the well-known marks doctrine should serve as 
an exception to the territoriality principle in federal trademark law.60 
B. Well-Known Marks in International Treaties 
Several international conventions and treaties have described, as well as 
strengthened, the well-known marks doctrine. This Subpart first discusses 
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement as notable 
international frameworks historically used by courts in determining what 
constitutes a well-known mark. The Subpart next describes more recent 
standards, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Joint 
Recommendation, that provide a clearer definition for how a mark obtains 
well-known status. The Subpart concludes by weighing the benefits and 
disadvantages of the European Union’s Community Trademark Regulation and 
argues that while greater harmonization across borders occurs in a unified 
trademark registration system, the European Union’s current approach contains 
several loopholes that still could promote confusion among well-known marks. 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. (“We are mindful that Congress has not hesitated to amend the Lanham Act to effect its intent 
with respect to trademark protection, having done so almost thirty times since the statute took effect in 
1947.”). 
 58 Id. at 165. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(finding that only Congress, and not the courts, can incorporate the well-known marks doctrine into the 
Lanham Act); see also Buti v. Impressa Perosa S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that no rights 
in the mark “Fashion Café” were created when an Italian company advertised its restaurant in the United 
States). 
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1. The Paris Convention and Article 6bis 
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was the first 
international treaty to govern patents, trademarks, and unfair competition 
law.61 The Paris Convention developed as an “effort to standardize and 
simplify the protection of intellectual property rights.”62 It emphasizes the 
principle of “national treatment,” which allows foreign nationals to receive the 
same protections in each of the Convention’s member countries as the country 
provides for its own citizens.63 The majority of courts in the United States have 
ruled that the Paris Convention is not self-executing,64 but it has been 
incorporated into U.S. law through the Lanham Act, which focuses on the 
principle of “national treatment” by allowing foreign nationals to receive the 
same protection against unfair competition as provided to U.S. nationals.65 
Article 6bis in the Paris Convention stipulates that trademarks that have 
achieved well-known status in member countries may be protected within any 
other signatory state, even if the trademark in question has not demonstrated 
use in commerce in the other signatory state.66 Article 6bis prohibits 
registration of a trademark within a signatory state if the mark “constitutes a 
reproduction, imitation or translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark 
considered . . . to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a 
person entitled to the benefits of the present Convention and used for identical 
or similar goods.”67 The language therefore provides that each signatory state 
of the Paris Convention must forbid the registration of new marks that could 
create confusion with existing marks already well known within the state, even 
if those existing well-known marks have not been used within the state’s 
borders.68 Article 6bis of the Paris Convention attempts to protect trademark 
holders of all member countries by providing that mark holders receive the 
 
 61 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 62 BARBARA K. MÜLLER, MULTINATIONAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL 
TRADEMARK REGISTRATION TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE 45 (2002). 
 63 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:25, at 29-91 to -92. 
 64 See Int’l Café v. Hard Rock Café Int’l, 252 F.3d 1274, 1277 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The Paris 
Convention is not self-executing because, on its face, the Convention provides that it will become effective 
only through domestic legislation.”). 
 65 Lanham Act § 44(h). 
 66 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 61, art. 6bis. See generally 
MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:25, at 29-91 to -94. 
 67 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 61, art. 6bis. 
 68 See id. 
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same treatment when seeking trademark protection in other member states.69 
While Article 6bis stops short of creating an international trademark registry, it 
seemingly offers wide protection for foreign well-known marks. The United 
States is one of 173 countries that are members of the Paris Convention.70 By 
ratifying the Paris Convention, these countries have agreed to block—within 
their borders—the registration of new marks that could cause confusion with 
existing well-known marks originating in other member states.71 
2. TRIPS 
Similarly to Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, 
which was signed into law in 1994, also recognizes the well-known marks 
doctrine.72 TRIPS does not attempt to define “well-known marks,” but permits 
different nations to develop their own standards for determining what 
constitutes a well-known mark.73 Similarly to the Paris Convention, which 
mandates national treatment for trademarks among all member states, TRIPS 
advocates for standardized trademark treatment by obligating all World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) member countries to adopt the national-treatment 
approach.74 In examining whether a mark is well known, TRIPS states that 
each governing body may analyze “knowledge of the trademark in the relevant 
sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member concerned which has 
been obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark.”75 This language 
highlights a stark contrast between TRIPS and the Paris Convention. While 
TRIPS focuses on protecting marks within a “relevant sector of the public,” the 
Paris Convention mandates that a trademark must achieve well-known status 
 
 69 See id. 
 70 For a list of the contracting state parties to the Paris Convention, see Contracting Parties: Paris 
Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_ 
id=2 (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). 
 71 See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:25, at 29-93. 
 72 TRIPS, supra note 19, art. 16. 
 73 See id. art. 16(2). 
 74 Id. art. 3(1). Pursuant to Article 3: 
Each member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property, subject to 
the exceptions already provided in, respectively, the Paris Convention (1967), the Berne 
Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits. 
Id. 
 75 Id. art. 16(2). 
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within an entire country.76 Despite this provision, which seems to offer greater 
protection to marks because the mark must qualify as well known within only 
one sector of the public, TRIPS still fails to designate criteria for determining 
how a trademark qualifies as a well-known mark. This lack of guidance led 
countries to develop varying approaches as to what constituted a well-known 
mark, and many pushed for a clearer standard.77 
3. Recent Frameworks for Protecting Well-Known Marks 
a. WIPO Joint Recommendation 
In formulating a clearer standard sought by many nations, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) recommended factors in 1999 
that formed a new framework for recognizing well-known marks.78 The non-
binding WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the 
Protection of Well-Known Marks listed these factors, which are introduced in 
this Subpart, and expanded on the well-known mark requirements set forth in 
the Paris Convention and in TRIPS.79 The drafters of the Joint 
Recommendation intended to harmonize the international protection of well-
known marks;80 however, the Joint Recommendation departs from the 
traditional notion of territoriality by calling for trademarks to automatically 
achieve well-known status in a member state if the trademark is well known 
among relevant consumers in that state.81 Actual use of the mark within a 
country’s borders is not necessary for protection, as the major point of 
examination is whether the mark has developed a reputation within a relevant 
segment of the public.82 This standard, therefore, uses similar language to 
TRIPS in focusing on “the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in 
 
 76 Alexis Weissberger, Comment, Is Fame Alone Sufficient to Create Priority Rights: An International 
Perspective on the Viability of the Famous/Well-Known Marks Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 
754 (2006). 
 77 See id. (finding that the unclear nature of the well-known marks doctrine served as the impetus behind 
the WIPO Joint Recommendation, as member nations needed a consistent standard in applying the doctrine). 
 78 Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, World 
Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Doc. 833(E) (Sept. 29, 1999) [hereinafter WIPO Joint 
Recommendation], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pdf/ 
pub833.pdf. 
 79 Id. art. 2; see also TRIPS, supra note 19; Paris Convention, supra note 61, art. 6bis. 
 80 See WIPO Joint Recommendation, supra note 78, Preface (“The Recommendation is the first 
implementation of WIPO’s policy to adapt to the pace of change in the field of industrial property by 
considering new options for accelerating development of international harmonized common principles.”). 
 81 Id. art. 2. 
 82 See id. 
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the relevant sector of the public.”83 Furthermore, as part of a framework for 
defining when a mark has reached “well-known” status, the Joint 
Recommendation’s factors call for a non-exhaustive examination of: (1) the 
degree of recognition of the mark; (2) the duration, extent, and geographical 
area of the mark itself; (3) the duration, extent, and geographical area of any 
use, advertising, or publicity of the mark; (4) the duration and geographical 
area of any registration of the mark; (5) the extent to which the mark is 
recognized as well-known by authorities; and (6) the value associated with the 
mark.84 
In addition to determining whether a mark qualifies as well known within a 
member state, the Joint Recommendation also offers a mechanism for 
prioritizing conflicting marks. Through Articles 3(1) and 4(1)(b), the Joint 
Recommendation provides that registration should be denied if a mark offered 
for registration within a member state conflicts with a mark that already has 
achieved well-known status within the territory.85 This denial should occur if 
the new mark damages the interests of the holder of the well-known mark, or 
impairs, dilutes, or takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the 
well-known mark.86 Moreover, the Joint Recommendation advocates for 
analyzing bad faith as part of the determination as to whether a well-known 
mark has been infringed, as “cases involving the protection of a well-known 
mark very often involve an element of bad faith.”87 Authorities such as the 
International Trademark Association have concurred with the WIPO Joint 
Recommendation that a determination of bad faith should be considered when 
balancing competing claims to a well-known mark because “inconsistent 
application of rules for protection of well-known marks has fostered public 
deception and represents an obstacle for well-known mark holders. This 
threatens investment and honest trade.”88 
Although the factors listed in the WIPO Joint Recommendation create a 
series of considerations to be weighed in determining whether a mark has 
 
 83 Id. art. 2(1)(b). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. arts. 3(1), 4(1)(b). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 17. The explanatory notes accompanying the WIPO Joint Recommendation call for taking “bad 
faith” into account when balancing the interests of the trademark holder of the well-known mark with the 
interests of a third party. See id. 
 88 See Amicus Letter of the International Trademark Association in Intel v. PT Panggung Electronic 
Industries, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1514, 1522 (2002) (regarding Intel v. PT Panggung Elec. Indus., Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Indonesia, case no. 590PK/PDT/2001 (2001)). 
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achieved well-known status, the Joint Recommendation serves as a non-
binding guideline and is viewed as international “soft law.”89 However, nations 
in the midst of revising their own trademark regimes can choose to base their 
new laws on principles inherent in the WIPO Joint Recommendation. For 
example, many provisions added to Singapore’s updated Trade Marks Act in 
2004 were adopted from the WIPO Joint Recommendation, including a new 
section designed to determine whether a mark is “well known” within the 
country.90 Singapore directly adapted Article 2(1)(b) of the WIPO Joint 
Recommendation in listing the factors that must be taken into account to infer 
whether a mark has achieved well-known status in Singapore.91 Therefore, 
although the WIPO Joint Recommendation is considered soft law, its emphasis 
on promoting a clearer standard for what constitutes a well-known mark can 
serve as a valuable model for nations interested in reforming their trademark 
laws to further prevent consumer confusion. 
b. The European Union Approach 
The European Community treaty emphasizes the importance of the free 
movement of goods across the borders of European states. The treaty provides 
that the European Community shall exist as “an internal market characterized 
by the abolition . . . of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital.”92 To bolster the free movement of goods, the European 
Community Trademark Harmonization Directive, adopted in 1989, attempts to 
streamline the differing trademark laws of European Community member 
states.93 The Harmonization Directive, therefore, targets the disparities that 
exist within the laws of member states but does not establish a central system 
for European trademark regulation.94 
 
 89 See Doris Estelle Long, Is Fame All There Is?: Beating Global Monopolists At Their Own Marketing 
Game, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 123, 146–47 (2008) (finding that the WIPO Joint Recommendation 
serves as a powerful harmonizing tool among member countries but is considered soft law because the Joint 
Recommendation is not directly binding on any member countries). 
 90 See Burton Org, Protecting Well-Known Trade Marks: Perspectives from Singapore, 95 TRADEMARK 
REP. 1221, 1226 (2005). 
 91 See id. 
 92 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S 11, 1973 
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) [hereinafter EEC Treaty] art. 36; see also EEC Treaty art. 3, para. 1(a), (c). 
 93 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws 
of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) [hereinafter Harmonization Directive]. 
 94 See Eric P. Raciti, The Harmonization of Trademarks in the European Community, 78 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 51, 63 (1996) (finding that the Harmonization Directive focused on affecting national 
regimes of different member states, while the Community Trademark regulation established a central 
trademark administration). 
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The Directive requires all member states to incorporate several provisions 
in their trademarks, and it also recommends other optional laws to unify 
existing national laws that could be construed as blocking the free movement 
of goods.95 Under the Directive, all member states must adhere to the same 
criteria for: (1) refusing to register a mark;96 (2) conferring exclusive use in 
identical marks and prohibiting the use of any mark which could create a 
likelihood of confusion with the initial user’s mark;97 and (3) revoking a mark 
if the mark’s use serves to mislead the public, particularly as to the nature, 
quality, or geographical origin of the goods.98 
Five years after making national trademark laws more uniform through the 
implementation of the Harmonization Directive,99 the European Community 
adopted the Community Trademark regulation, which established a framework 
for a community-wide trademark that receives protection in all member 
states.100 The new regulation was not intended to supersede the Harmonization 
Directive; instead, the two laws are meant to work in tandem to provide for 
streamlined national laws as well as for a common trademark system at the 
community level.101 According to the European Council regulation that created 
the Community Trademark, “trade marks need to be created which are 
governed by a uniform Community law” for the purpose of opening up 
“unrestricted economic activity in the whole of the common market,” but the 
community trademark law “nevertheless does not replace the laws of the 
Member States on trade marks.”102 
i. Benefits of the European Union’s Community Trademark 
The Community Trademark functions by allowing a business to file a 
single application to register its trademark throughout the European Union 
(“EU”), meaning that the sole application is the only requirement necessary to 
protect a mark against potential infringers.103 Differing local standards for 
 
 95 See Harmonization Directive, supra note 93, pmbl. 
 96 Id. art. 3(1). 
 97 Id. art. 5(1). 
 98 Id. art. 12(2)(b). 
 99 The Harmonization Directive was adopted in 1988, while the Community Trademark regulation was 
adopted in 1993. Id.; Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, 
1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation (EC) 40/94]. 
 100 Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, supra note 99. 
 101 See GUY TRITTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 129 (1996).  
 102 Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, supra note 99, at 802. 
 103 See Douglas D. Hancock, The Frontier-Free European Union: European Community Trademarks Hail 
a New Day for Intellectual Property Laws, 56 OR. ST. B. BULL. 19, 19 (1996). 
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trademark enforcement—such as varying provisions for registrations, transfers, 
and revocations—no longer apply at the community level, as one trademark 
registration retains effect across borders.104 The desire to rid the trademark 
application process from confusing international standards served as a major 
impetus behind adopting the Community Trademark, as the Council stated: 
“[A Community trademark] shall have equal effect throughout the Community: 
it shall not be registered, transferred or surrendered or be the subject of a 
decision revoking the rights of the proprietor or declaring it invalid, nor shall 
its use be prohibited, save in respect of the whole Community.”105 
The EU now encompasses twenty-seven countries,106 so the Community 
Trademark system often saves an applicant money, time, and effort by only 
requiring one application for the benefit of protection across twenty-seven 
nations.107 Therefore, a well-known mark created and registered in one 
European nation is automatically protected by all nations in the EU economic 
zone, even without use in commerce or evidence that the mark had attained a 
requisite level of reputation or goodwill. Furthermore, the advantages extend 
beyond applicants from the twenty-seven member states of the EU. Any 
national of a country that has ratified the Paris Convention, or operates an 
industrial or commercial establishment in a Paris Convention nation, is eligible 
to apply for, and to potentially receive, a Community Trademark.108 
ii. Potential Disadvantages of the European Union System 
In analyzing the European system, some commentators have determined 
that the Community Trademark improves efficiency,109 and others have 
provided application statistics showing that Europe’s intellectual property 
community has embraced the system.110 However, other scholars have noted 
 
 104 See id. at 20. 
 105 See Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, supra note 99, at 805. 
 106 The 27 Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/27-member-
countries/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2011) (listing the current EU countries, as well as the candidates 
for future membership). 
 107 See Martin J. Beran, Single Trademark Application for the European Community, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11, 
1995, col. 1, at 1. 
 108 TRITTON, supra note 101, at 146. 
 109 Scott A. McKenzie, Global Protection of Trademark Intellectual Property Rights: A Comparison of 
Infringement and Remedies Available in China Versus the European Union, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 529, 541–42 
(1999) (finding that the European Community Trademark system has improved efficiency in protecting 
trademarks across the region as long as the mark has been used in one country). 
 110 See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:35, at 29-114 to -115. From 1996 until 2001, the Office received 
about 42,000 applications per year. Id. 
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potential disadvantages in the creation of a system that promotes one 
trademark across the entire European Community. Commentators have argued 
that a Community Trademark could conflict with prior rights and still lead to a 
likelihood of confusion.111 For example, if a national trademark holder has 
obtained trademark rights in a specific locality, the mark’s owner still can 
retain the rights in that locality if another applicant later obtains a Community 
Trademark and gains the rights to the mark in the remainder of the European 
Community’s member states.112 If the goal of the Community Trademark 
system is to create a uniform marketplace for the free movement of goods 
across borders, allowing several similar trademarks to coexist in different local 
regions seemingly would conflict with that aim and lead to confusion in the 
eyes of the public. 
Others have questioned how the expansion of the EU would impact 
trademark rights, especially if a person within a new member state previously 
has registered a mark within the new member state’s borders that conflicts with 
an existing Community trademark.113 The potential solution of allowing both 
the new member state’s mark and the Community mark to remain in place—
rather than invalidating one of them retroactively—would further detract from 
the unifying purpose of the Community Trademark system. This dual 
trademark system also seemingly would lead to a high level of consumer 
confusion. This Comment later addresses how it might be unfair to compare an 
international registry to the European Community’s trademark model because 
of inherent structural differences.114 
II. A CASE STUDY: ANALYZING WELL-KNOWN FOREIGN MARKS THROUGH A 
CUBAN NEXUS 
Cuba is an island nation located only ninety miles south of Florida,115 but 
relations between Cuba and the United States have been far from neighborly. 
 
 111 See TRITTON, supra note 101, at 159. 
 112 Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, supra note 99, art. 107 (providing that a national trademark holder of 
a mark can prevent the Community Trademark from being used in the locality where he has previously 
obtained rights, but the Community Trademark would govern in the rest of the Community). 
 113 See TRITTON, supra note 101, at 159–60 (finding that when the EU expands and includes a new 
member state that brings trademarks that are substantially similar to existing Community Trademarks, either 
the Community Trademark would have to be invalidated, or the conflicting national mark would have to yield 
to the Community Trademark).  
 114 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 115 JAIME SUCHLICKI, CUBA: FROM COLUMBUS TO CASTRO AND BEYOND 3 (5th ed. 2002). 
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The U.S. government has banned trade with Cuba for nearly five decades,116 
following Fidel Castro’s rise to power in 1959.117 During his first years in 
power, Fidel Castro canceled promised elections, suspended Cuba’s existing 
constitution, seized property and business holdings for the government without 
compensation, and began the process of changing Cuba into a communist 
country.118 The economic sanctions promulgated by the U.S. government 
following the rise of Castro’s communist government—which some call the 
most stringent embargo imposed by the United States on any nation in the 
world119—have remained in place, cutting off trade, travel, and investments 
between the two nations.120 The Cuban government estimates that the U.S. 
trade ban has cost Cuba approximately $89 billion in the nearly five decades of 
the embargo’s existence.121 
Recently, however, a series of milestone events have generated a 
heightened level of discourse about the future of U.S. policy toward Cuba.122 
After several years as the interim leader, Raul Castro succeeded his brother123 
as president of Cuba in February 2008,124 and Barack Obama was elected as 
President of the United States in November 2008.125 These leadership changes, 
 
 116 See REESE ERLICH, DATELINE HAVANA 72 (2009) (discussing how every presidential administration 
since Dwight D. Eisenhower has maintained economic sanctions against Cuba). 
 117 Id. at 137–38. 
 118 See Crystal Jamison, Family Tradition: Cuban Policy Reform as Raul Castro Takes the Reins, 15 LAW 
& BUS. REV. AM. 891, 892 (2009) (citing Bradley T. Gilmore, U.S.-Cuba Compensation Policy, 8 TEX. HISP. 
J.L. & POL’Y 79, 82 (2002)). 
 119 ERLICH, supra note 116, at 72 (finding that U.S. policy allows for citizens to travel to enemy nations 
such as Iran and North Korea, but not to Cuba, and that no other country observes the embargo against Cuba). 
 120 The Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (2011).  
 121 See ERLICH, supra note 116, at 75 (citing a Cuban-backed media article listing the economic effects of 
the U.S. blockade). 
 122 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 111TH CONG., CHANGING CUBA POLICY—IN THE UNITED STATES 
NATIONAL INTEREST v (Comm. Print 2009) (letter of transmittal of Sen. Richard Lugar, Ranking Member, S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations). 
 123 Because he was about to undergo surgery, Fidel Castro temporarily turned power over to his brother 
and vice president, Raul, in late July of 2006. James C. McKinley, Jr., Fidel Castro Resigns as Cuba’s 
President, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/world/americas/20castro.html. 
Fidel never fully recovered, and he opted not to continue in office following the surgery. Id. Raul Castro’s 
official election as president came in 2008, when the National Assembly voted him into the leadership position 
permanently. See ERLICH, supra note 116, at 185. 
 124 This change in leadership is significant because some commentators viewed the likelihood of Cuba 
opening up and moving away from communism under Fidel Castro as negligible. See SUCHLICKI, supra note 
115 (“There has been no indication that [Fidel] Castro intends to truly open up the island’s political or 
economic system or promote a peaceful solution to Cuba’s deepening crisis.”). 
125 Adam Nagourney, Obama Wins Election; McCain Loses as Bush Legacy Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05campaign.html. Senator Richard Lugar wrote that 
Raul Castro’s ascension to power and Obama’s election, coupled with the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban 
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as well as President Obama’s promise during the presidential campaign to 
examine the Cuban embargo by lifting restrictions on Cuban-American travel 
to the island, have led some commentators to state that both countries have 
entered into a time of reevaluation of their “complex relationship.”126 In April 
2009, only three months after his inauguration, President Obama reached out to 
Cuba by abandoning restrictions on Cuban Americans’ ability to travel to the 
island and to send money to family members still living there.127 He called for 
“a new day” in the tumultuous relationship between the nations, while 
continuing to emphasize that he will not lift the trade embargo until Cuba 
undertakes democratic reforms.128 In August 2010, the Miami Herald reported 
that the Obama administration soon would announce an expansion of 
“educational and cultural travel” to Cuba, as well as an easier method of 
paying for telephone services in Cuba.129 Sources told the newspaper that the 
easing of travel restrictions would serve as the Obama administration’s 
response to an effort by the Cuban government to release more than fifty 
political prisoners by September 2010.130 
The controversial issue of Cuba’s political prisoners has served as only one 
of several roadblocks encountered by President Obama as he attempts to 
mitigate the embargo’s effect. In September 2009, Obama renewed the trade 
embargo between the two nations for another year, leading the United Nations 
(“UN”) General Assembly to pass a non-binding resolution condemning the 
embargo for the eighteenth consecutive year.131 On December 5, 2009, the 
 
revolution, have generated an increased level of discussion about the direction of U.S. policy toward the 
island. See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 122, at v. 
 126 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 122, at v. Senator Richard Lugar wrote that the 
relationship between the United States and Cuba can be viewed as complex because it has been marked by 
“misunderstanding, suspicion, and open hostility.” Id. 
 127 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Damien Cave, Loosening Cuba Restrictions, Obama Leaves the Door Ajar for 
More, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, at A6. Even though it appears to be a modest step, the Obama 
administration’s decision to lift restrictions on Cuban Americans visiting relatives or sending money has been 
called “the most significant shift in United States policy toward Cuba in decades” by some commentators. Id. 
 128 Obama Offers Cuba “New Beginning,” BBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2009, 6:17 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/8004798.stm (“The U.S. seeks a new beginning with Cuba. I know there is a longer journey that must be 
travelled to overcome the decades of mistrust, but there are critical steps we can take toward a new day.”); see 
also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Alexei Barrionuevo, Obama Declares U.S. Will Pursue Thaw with Cuba, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at A1. 
 129 Juan O. Tamayo, U.S. Could Ease Restrictions on “Purposeful” Visits to Cuba, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 
6, 2010), http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/08/06/v-print/1765507/us-could-ease-restrictions-on.html. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Neil MacFarquhar, U.S. Embargo on Cuba Again Finds Scant Support at U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2009, at A8 (reporting that despite President Obama’s moderate steps at easing relations, the UN vote in 
support of the resolution shows that little has changed in regard to the international community’s view of the 
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Cuban government arrested a U.S. subcontractor in Havana for distributing 
telecommunications equipment.132 The Cuban government accused the 
contractor of working as a spy for U.S. intelligence services, but the U.S. State 
Department said his presence in the country was part of an effort to 
“transition” Cuba to democracy by disseminating devices, such as computers 
and cell phones, that could circumnavigate the government’s control.133 The 
contractor’s arrest potentially could cause more trouble for the tenuous 
relationship between the United States and Cuba, as Cuban leader Raul Castro 
did not appear eager to establish closer ties with the United States when he 
stated during a December 2009 speech following the subcontractor’s arrest that 
“‘the enemy is as active as ever.’”134 
The imprisonment of the subcontractor serves as telling evidence that Cuba 
will not necessarily become a more hospitable place simply because Fidel 
Castro has ceded power to his brother. Nicknamed “the Prussian,” Raul Castro 
boasts a reputation as a “widely feared hard-liner” who has incarcerated scores 
of political prisoners.135 A November 2009 investigative report by Human 
Rights Watch documented more than forty cases in which Cuba has 
imprisoned individuals for “dangerousness” under Raul Castro as the 
individuals attempted to exercise their fundamental rights.136 The Cuban 
Criminal Code defines “dangerousness” as any behavior that contradicts 
socialist norms, and Cuba relies on the provision to imprison individuals 
before they have committed a crime, simply based on the suspicion that they 
might commit a crime in the future that runs contrary to “‘the ends of the 
socialist state.’”137 According to the Human Rights Watch report, Cuba, under 
Raul Castro’s leadership, violates human rights by operating as a “state that 
uses repression to enforce conformity with its political agenda.”138 
Officials with the U.S. State Department have cited Cuba’s human rights 
record as justification for the continuing economic sanctions, stating that Cuba 
 
economic blockade); see also ERLICH, supra note 116, at 72 (finding that every year since 1992, the United 
Nations has voted by an overwhelming majority to condemn the embargo, with the 2007 vote tallying 184 to 4 
against the United States). 
 132 See Frances Robles, U.S. Says Contractor Arrested in Cuba Is No Spy, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 8, 2010, 
available at 2010 WLNR 363589. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Jamison, supra note 118, at 904. 
 136 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEW CASTRO, SAME CUBA: POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE POST-FIDEL ERA 1 
(2009), available at www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/11/18/new-castro-same-cuba. 
 137 Id. at 1–2. 
 138 Id. at 2. 
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must free political prisoners, respect human rights, and create a mechanism for 
free elections for the embargo to be lifted.139 Cuba’s treatment of imprisoned 
political dissidents attracted widespread attention in February 2010, when a 
jailed dissident died while protesting his detention with a hunger strike that 
lasted more than two months.140 Family members of the prisoner, who was 
labeled as a “prisoner of conscience” by Amnesty International, blamed the 
death on Raul Castro’s government and said that prison officials also denied 
the prisoner water while he engaged in the hunger strike.141 
The Human Rights Watch report blames the Cuban government for the 
country’s human rights abuses, but also finds fault with the international 
community for failing to hold Cuba to its promises of change.142 For example, 
Raul Castro authorized the signing of two UN human rights treaties 
immediately after his formal ascension to the presidency, but neither treaty has 
been ratified or implemented.143 The report argues that the restrictive economic 
sanctions placed on Cuba by the United States have led to the unintended 
effect of arousing sympathy for Cuba and distracting the international 
community from the country’s human rights abuses.144 According to the report: 
There is no question: the Cuban government bears full and exclusive 
responsibility for the abuses it commits. However, so long as the 
embargo remains in place, the Castro government will continue to 
manipulate US policy to cast itself as a Latin American David 
standing up to the US Goliath, a role it exploits skillfully.145 
Even if Cuba ends its repressive human rights policies, other disputes 
between the United States and Cuba must be resolved before any easing of the 
embargo is considered. In particular, ongoing trademark issues would need to 
be addressed before the two nations could work toward normalizing 
relations.146 During the embargo, several U.S. companies have used brand 
names that originated in Cuba, as increasingly strict federal laws have barred 
companies affiliated with the Cuban government from registering their 
 
 139 Press Release, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs on U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (Aug. 25, 2006), http://nassau.usembassy.gov/pr_25082006.html. 
 140 Marc Lacey, Dissident’s Death Ignites Protest Actions in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at A7. 
 141 Id. 
 142 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 136, at 3–4. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 7. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Weissert & Felderbaum, supra note 18. 
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products in the United States.147 Without the embargo in place to block the 
Cuban entities’ claims to disputed trademarks, the clash over the rightful 
ownership of these trademarks could stretch from the U.S. courts to Congress 
to the boardrooms of some of the largest U.S. corporations.148 In particular, 
disputes involving Havana Club rum and Cohiba cigars have spanned 
approximately a decade each in litigation.149 Both the Havana Club rum and 
Cohiba cigar cases illustrate the trademark friction that exists between the 
United States and Cuba as a result of the trade embargo. 
A. The Saga of Havana Club Rum 
Before Castro’s ascension, Cuba boasted a thriving tourism industry. 
Dissuaded from European travel during the carnage of World War I, wealthy 
American tourists instead turned their attention to Cuba as a vacation 
destination.150 The island’s popularity boomed in the early 1920s,151 following 
the start of the Prohibition era in the United States.152 The accessibility of 
flowing alcohol, coupled with Cuba’s sun, beaches, legal gambling, and 
prominent prostitution industry, served as a strong allure.153 As one author 
wrote, “Booze, gambling and sex. What more could a Yankee tourist ask 
for?”154 
1. One Family’s Role in the History of Havana Club Rum 
The spirits industry became instrumental in promoting the island’s image 
as an exotic and liberating vacation spot.155 The Arechabala family founded a 
 
 147 Id. The article lists Cohiba, Havana Club, Rico Habano, and Havana Honeys as Cuban labels now 
produced outside of the island. Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 ALFREDO JOSE ESTRADA, HAVANA: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A CITY 158–60 (2007). 
 151 See ERLICH, supra note 116, at xi (discussing how the United States remained the leading power in 
Cuba during the first half of the 1900s, and how wealthy Americans dominated the island through the sugar 
industry, tourism, gambling, and prostitution). 
 152 Id. By the 1920s, Cuba boasted roughly 7000 drinking establishments. ESTRADA, supra note 150, at 
160. 
 153 See ESTRADA, supra note 150, at 159 (“Prohibition virtually created the Cuban tourist industry, adding 
plentiful rum to the allures of sun and sultry señoritas.”). 
 154 T.J. ENGLISH, HAVANA NOCTURNE: HOW THE MOB OWNED CUBA AND THEN LOST IT TO THE 
REVOLUTION 12 (2007). 
 155 See ESTRADA, supra note 150, at 159. 
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company in 1878 that began producing Havana Club rum.156 However, after 
Castro assumed power in 1960, he confiscated all private property belonging to 
Cuban nationals.157 The national government expropriated the Arechabalas’ 
distilleries and they subsequently left Cuba for Europe.158 However, Castro’s 
1960 expropriation of business did not affect trademark registrations in the 
United States, where the Arechabala family continued to own the registered 
mark to Havana Club rum, even though they no longer had the capability to 
actually produce the rum.159 In 1973, the Arechabalas allowed their U.S. 
trademark registration to lapse, even though registration renewal would have 
cost the family only twenty-five dollars.160 
This abandonment allowed the Cuban government to register the “Havana 
Club” mark three years later with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) in 1976.161 Although the embargo between the United States and 
Cuba blocked trade, both countries upheld the intellectual property rights they 
established at the Inter-American Convention.162 These rights permitted Cuban 
trademarks to be registered in the U.S. PTO without issue, even though the 
products associated with the trademarks were not available for sale within the 
United States.163 Though Cuba was prevented from selling Havana Club rum 
in the U.S. market, the country hoped its registration of the mark, and continual 
timely renewals, would position it to sell Havana Club rum in a post-embargo 
marketplace.164 In 1993, the Cuban government entered into a partnership with 
Pernod Ricard, a French wine distributor, and later assigned the trademark to 
Havana Club Holdings, a new company formed as a result of the joint 
 
 156 An Examination of Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 8 (2004) [hereinafter Examination of Section 211 Hearing] (testimony of 
Ramon Arechabala). 
 157 Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 119 (2d. Cir. 2000). When Castro seized 
and appropriated the Arechabala family’s assets in 1960, the family never received compensation from the 
Cuban government. Id. at 119–20. 
 158 Id. Ramon Arechabala, the great-grandson of the founder of Havana Club rum, stated that Castro threw 
him in jail following Castro’s rise to power on December 31, 1959, and only released him under the condition 
that he leave the country. See Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 8 (testimony of Ramon 
Arechabala). The Arechabala family then immigrated to Spain. Id. He subsequently came to Miami in 1967 
and became an American citizen. Id. 
 159 See id. 
 160 See Arian Campo-Flores, Rum Warriors, AM. LAW., Jan. 6, 2000, at 59. 
 161 Havana Club Holding, 203 F.3d at 120. 
 162 General Inter-American Convention for Trademark & Commercial Protection pmbl., Feb. 20, 1929, 46 
Stat. 2907 (listing Cuba as a signatory state). 
 163 See Carlos Enrique Alfaro, Panel #4: Intellectual Property and the Rule of Law, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 357, 376–77 (2008). 
 164 Campo-Flores, supra note 160, at 59.  
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venture.165 The joint venture registered the “Havana Club” mark in more than 
eighty countries,166 and worldwide sales of the rum doubled between the joint 
venture’s start in 1994 and 1998.167 
Understandably, the Arechabala family has long argued that the 
confiscation by Castro’s government was an illegal appropriation of their 
property and that it should retain all rights to Havana Club rum. In testimony 
before a U.S. Senate committee, Ramon Arechabala recounted how armed 
members of Castro’s government, on December 31, 1959, “took all my assets 
and threw us out of the company and removed us from being able to go to 
work at the company.”168 He showed his anger at the joint venture between the 
Cuban government and Pernod Ricard by stating: 
[W]hat happened to my family was wrong. We wanted to keep 
selling Havana Club rum, but we were prevented from doing so 
because of this confiscation of the distillery, this robbery of my 
distillery, my business in Cuba. Castro’s wrong to me and my family 
continues today because the Cuban/Pernod venture continues to trade 
off Havana Club’s reputation with a product that can never be the 
same Havana Club rum that we used to make. The government stole 
my assets, my family heritage, and much of my children’s future.169 
In the mid-1990s, the Arechabala family partnered with Bacardi.170 Bacardi 
paid $1.25 million for the supposed rights to the trademark, arguing that 
because Castro’s nationalization of property was illegal, the family still 
retained its rights to the “Havana Club” mark and possessed the ability to 
assign it.171 Bacardi then began distributing its own version of the rum, made 
in the Bahamas, in the U.S. market.172 This action led Havana Club Holdings, 
backed by the Cuban government, to file a trademark infringement suit 
claiming that Bacardi’s sales violated Havana Club Holdings’ trade name to 
 
 165 Havana Club Holding, 203 F.3d at 120. 
 166 Anthony Gardner, A Rum Fight May Embarrass U.S., NAT’L L.J., Sept. 11, 2000, at A21. 
 167 Campo-Flores, supra note 160, at 59. 
 168 Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 8 (testimony of Ramon Arechabala). 
 169 Id. at 9. 
 170 Havana Club Holding, 203 F.3d at 120; see also Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, 
at 8–9 (testimony of Ramon Arechabala) (testifying that the partnership with Bacardi only occurred because 
Arechabala wanted to keep the rights to Havana Club rum, but needed a distillery that actually made rum in 
order to do so). 
 171 Campo-Flores, supra note 160, at 59. 
 172 Havana Club Holding, 203 F.3d at 121. From May to August 1996, Bacardi distributed 906 cases of 
Havana Club rum in the United States, resulting in Havana Club Holdings’ decision to file an action in 
December to enjoin Bacardi from using the “Havana Club” trademark. Id.  
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Havana Club rum.173 Because the trademark rights to Havana Club rum were 
claimed both by Bacardi (after it partnered with the founding Arechabala 
family) and by Pernod Ricard acting on behalf of the Cuban government, the 
dispute reached U.S. federal court.174 
2. The Assignment of the Havana Club Trademark: Was It Valid? 
Before analyzing the Havana Club rum litigation, it is necessary to examine 
if Bacardi even possesses a valid claim to the “Havana Club” trademark. On 
one hand, it seems clear that Bacardi could be viewed as a successor to the 
mark because the mark originated with the Arechabala family, and the family 
chose Bacardi to carry on its rum-producing legacy. However, such a theory 
would ignore established trademark principles such as the consequences of 
abandonment and excusable non-use. 
Under the Lanham Act, a mark shall be deemed as abandoned when its use 
has been discontinued with the intent not to resume such use, and non-use for 
three consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.175 
When the Arechabala family’s trademarks for Havana Club rum began to 
lapse, the family needed to renew the U.S. mark to prevent the loss of its 
rights.176 However, Ramon Arechabala stated that the family believed it was 
only allowed to renew the marks if it was currently producing rum and actually 
using the marks in commerce.177 Therefore, because the Arechabalas were not 
using their mark in commerce, they believed renewal was impossible, and, 
even after consulting a non-trademark specialist lawyer, they felt they had no 
choice but to allow their U.S. registration for the mark to lapse.178 However, 
the U.S. PTO provides for a narrow exception to use in commerce in allowing 
for “excusable non-use” of a trademark.179 Because the Cuban embargo 
qualifies as an excusable non-use, the Arechabalas faced a simple path for 
keeping their registration of the mark.180 To prevent the mark from expiring, 
the family only had to file an affidavit and pay a small fee.181 Instead, because 
they were unaware of the “excusable non-use” exception, the Arechabalas’ 
 
 173 Id. 
 174 See id. at 120–21. 
 175 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 176 See id.; Campo-Flores, supra note 160, at 59. 
 177 Campo-Flores, supra note 160, at 59.  
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
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rights to the mark lapsed and the Cuban government applied for the 
trademark.182 
There exists a well-accepted norm against recognizing the confiscation of 
property rights without compensation,183 and this Comment does not argue that 
Fidel Castro’s government was morally justified to expropriate the Arechabala 
family business and distillery in 1960 during the nationalization of all property 
in Cuba. However, the Arechabala family should not be excused from 
following established intellectual property principles—such as trademark 
renewal—simply because they suffered when their real property was 
confiscated. Such a decision would allow scores of other business owners to 
also argue that they deserve some sort of exception for the registrations and 
renewals of their trademarks. Despite his abhorrent human rights record, 
Castro never seized the Arechabalas’ trademark to Havana Club rum; the 
Cuban government earned it legally by applying to the U.S. PTO after the 
family’s inaction caused its mark to expire. Therefore, the family had no legal 
rights to the “Havana Club” mark when it transferred the mark to Bacardi. As a 
U.S. senator framed the issue during a U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearing, in which Ramon Arechabala was present: 
I totally agree with you and the passion you expressed about 
confiscation of property by Fidel Castro. That, in my opinion, is no 
longer the issue here. Clearly, he confiscated the physical properties 
of Havana Club. But the property right trademark resided in this 
country, not in Cuba. It was registered here. And it appears that the 
ability to re-register that with a $25 check did not happen.184 
3. Stronger Anti-Cuba Laws Impact Ruling in Havana Club Legislation 
The end of the 1990s—the same time period as when the Havana Club rum 
litigation began winding its way through the federal courts—also saw the 
implementation of two federal laws that strengthened the Cuban embargo and 
further frayed relations with the island nation. In 1996, Brothers to the Rescue, 
a Cuban-American group based in Miami, flew two unarmed civilian airplanes 
near the island for what it claimed was the purpose of spotting Cuban rafters 
 
 182 Id. 
 183 Bruce Lehman, A Victory of Law Over Politics, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 2000, col. 3, at 2. 
 184 Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 2 (testimony of Sen. Larry Craig). 
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and informing the U.S. Coast Guard of the rafters’ locations.185 Cuba shot 
down the aircraft over international waters, killing all four Brothers to the 
Rescue members involved in the flights.186 As a punishment for this perceived 
act of aggression, the U.S. Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, also known as the Helms-Burton Act.187 
The law, supported and signed by the Clinton administration, dissuaded 
foreign companies and nationals from investing in properties confiscated by 
Castro’s communist government and prohibited executives in those companies 
from traveling to the United States,188 among other restrictions aimed at 
deterring foreign investments in Cuba. In particular, the act contained a 
provision that gave Congress power over the embargo, removing the future of 
the embargo from sole presidential control.189 
In 1998, another provision affecting Cuba, Section 211, was inserted into 
the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act.190 Section 211(2)(b) states: 
No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any 
assertion of treaty rights by a designated national or its successor-in-
interest under sections 44 (b) or (e) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 
U.S.C. 1126 (b) or (e)) for a mark, trade name, or commercial name 
that is the same as or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or 
commercial name that was used in connection with a business or 
assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of such mark, 
trade name, or commercial name, or the bona-fide successor-in-
interest has expressly consented.191 
In summary, Section 211 prohibits the U.S. government from approving 
trademarks in connection with businesses that have been previously 
confiscated by any foreign government.192 In ruling on the “Havana Club” 
 
 185 SUCHLICKI, supra note 115, at 203. The Brothers to the Rescue group argued that its purpose was to 
assist the U.S. Coast Guard, but on other flights over Cuban airspace, the group dropped anti-Castro leaflets in 
Havana. See id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 11 Stat. 785 (1996) 
(codifying the regulations implementing the Cuban embargo); see 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h) (2006). 
 188 SUCHLICKI, supra note 115, at 203–04. 
 189 ERLICH, supra note 116, at 53. 
 190 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, § 211(b), 112 Stat. 2681. 
 191 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 211(b). 
 192 Julie Kay, Cuba Libre Wars, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., July 28, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 
18284887. 
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mark following the passage of this provision, the Second Circuit held that 
Section 211 intended to block transfers of trademarks that had been previously 
confiscated by Castro’s communist government, such as the “Havana Club” 
mark.193 Accordingly, the court held that the Cuban government’s partnership 
with Pernod Ricard could not receive any trademark rights enforced in a U.S. 
court after the passage of Section 211, and Bacardi was awarded the right to 
distribute Havana Club rum in the United States.194 
4. The “Bacardi Bill” 
The lobbying power of Bacardi195 helped lead to the passage of Section 
211, as company representatives pushed lawmakers196 such as former Florida 
Senator Connie Mack to enact a statute that would address trademarks in the 
same vein as other property nationalized by Fidel Castro’s government.197 The 
statute blocked the U.S. registration, renewal, or recognition of trademarks 
confiscated by the Cuban government without the consent of the trademark’s 
original owner.198 In addition, Section 211 denied Cuban nationals and their 
successors access to the U.S. court system if they disputed trademark rights.199 
 
 193 Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 127 (2d. Cir. 2000) (finding that Section 
211(b) applies because Havana Club Holdings is a designated national under Section 211(b), organized under 
the laws of Cuba). 
 194 Id. 
 195 The Washington Post and Daily Business Review reported in 2002 that Florida Governor Jeb Bush 
conducted a personal e-mail lobbying campaign on behalf of Bacardi, while the company gave tens of 
thousands of dollars to the Governor’s reelection campaign and to the Florida Republican Party. Julie Kay, 
Havana Club Patent Ruling Doesn’t Go Down Smooth, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 14, 2006, available at 
2006 WLNR 25547320. Also, campaign finance records show that Bacardi provided key lawmakers with 
thousands of dollars in campaign contributions during the debate over Section 211’s passage. See Dan 
Christensen, Friends of Bacardi: As Donations Flowed, Heavyweight Lawmakers Pleaded Spirits Giant’s 
Case for Havana Club, 79 MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV. 1 (2004), available at 2004 WLNR 23370128. Christensen 
reported that three powerful lawmakers sent letters to the Commerce Secretary on behalf of Bacardi. Id. After 
sending those letters, Representative Tom Delay’s political groups received $43,000, Representative Henry 
Bonilla’s leadership group received $10,000 and Senator Fritz Hollings’s leadership group received a $5000 
contribution. Id. 
 196 Courts do not always react favorably to lobbying efforts by politicians, and sometimes the lobbying 
backfires. In OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc., 558 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 2009), the PTO only “grudgingly” 
issued a trademark registration for OBX as an abbreviation for the Outer Banks, North Carolina after the 
region’s congressional delegation intervened with an intense lobbying effort. Id. The court held that this 
lobbying effort “undermined” whatever support OBX-Stock might try to claim from the registration. Id. 
 197 See Kay, supra note 195. 
 198 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 211(a)(2). 
 199 Id. § 211(b). 
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Because of Section 211, Bacardi achieved its primary goal of maintaining 
the “Havana Club” trademark. The courts sided with Bacardi in barring Pernod 
Ricard and Havana Club Holdings from claiming the trademark to the rum, and 
the U.S. trade embargo with Cuba was further bolstered by limiting the 
communist government’s ability to profit from confiscated trademarks.200 
Although the bill never specifically mentioned the Cuban embargo, 
international trade experts believe that the provision was written for the sole 
purpose of helping Bacardi secure the trademark rights to Havana Club rum,201 
based on evidence of the intense lobbying effort conducted on Bacardi’s 
behalf.202 
The Second Circuit also ruled against Havana Club’s assertions that its 
trademark infringement claim should be recognized under the Inter-American 
Convention, a multilateral treaty of which Cuba, the United States, and ten 
other countries are members.203 The court held that “[w]ith respect to the 
Cuban embargo, the purpose of Congress could not be more clear. Congress 
wished to prevent any Cuban national or entity from attracting hard currency 
into Cuba by selling, assigning or otherwise transferring rights subject to 
United States jurisdiction.”204 Because Havana Club rum was viewed as 
property confiscated by the Cuban government, the Second Circuit held that 
Section 211 prevented the use of the Inter-American Convention’s provisions 
to support Havana Club rum’s trademark infringement claim.205 Section 211 
served as the primary factor in the court’s decision, instead of international 
intellectual property treaties. 
Alleging that U.S. courts have used Section 211 to circumvent established 
international intellectual property principles, European nations and the World 
Trade Organization have called for substantial changes to the provision.206 
 
 200 Emily Taylor, The Havana Club Saga: Threatening More than Just Cuba Coke, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 513, 518 (2004) (citing Ashley C. Adams, Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act: The Threat to 
International Protection of U.S. Trademarks, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 221–22 (2002)). 
 201 Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 12 (testimony of Bruce A. Lehman) (“[I]f you 
read Section 211, it incorporates or references back to our embargo law and regulations, and they are 
obviously addressed to Cuba.”). 
 202 Kay, supra note 192. 
 203 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:26, at 29-94; see also General Inter-American Convention for 
Trademark & Commercial Protection, supra note 162 (stating that the countries adhering to the Inter-American 
Convention of 1923 are Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
United States, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic). 
 204 Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 124 (2d. Cir. 2000). 
 205 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:26, at 29-94. 
 206 See infra Part IV.A. 
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Although Congress has debated several “fixes” to Section 211 that would 
better align it with international trademark standards, no action has been taken 
yet.207 The objections of the WTO, as well as the legislative fixes to Section 
211 debated by Congress, are analyzed in detail later in this Comment.208 
B. Smoked Out: Trademark Dispute Over Cohiba Cigars 
In addition to its spirits industry, Cuba has attracted international fame for 
the high quality of its unique cigars.209 Cuban cigars have been called “perhaps 
the world’s most revered,”210 and Cigar Aficionado Magazine estimates that, 
even with the embargo’s trade restrictions, Americans still manage to consume 
roughly twenty million Cuban cigars each year by purchasing them while on 
vacation in other countries and bringing them back to the United States.211 
Millions of dollars flow into Cuba annually from cigar exports, with one 
official estimating that the country made $240 million from the cigar trade in 
2003.212 
One Cuban company responsible for producing such in-demand cigars, 
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco (“Cubatabaco”), registered the “Cohiba”213 mark 
in Cuba in 1969 and began selling the cigars outside of Cuba in 1982.214 
However, because of the U.S. embargo blocking the importation of Cuban 
goods, Cubatabaco never sold Cohiba cigars in the United States215 and 
therefore failed to establish “use in commerce” within the country. Because 
Cubatabaco never applied for a U.S. trademark, American-based General Cigar 
Co. seized the opportunity in the marketplace and registered the Cohiba brand 
as a trademark in the United States in 1981.216 The American company again 
 
 207 See infra Part III.B. 
 208 For a discussion of the World Trade Organization’s objections to Section 211, and the two legislative 
fixes debated by Congress, see Part III.A–B. 
 209 But see Daniela Mohor, Socialism and the Cigar, in CAPITALISM, GOD AND A GOOD CIGAR 156–57 
(Lydia Chavez ed., 2005) (finding that although Cuban cigars have enjoyed a “fine reputation” for decades, the 
nation’s efforts to boost production of cigars to bolster its economy could be leading to a decrease in cigar 
quality, as so many new and untrained workers are now employed in the cigar-making industry to meet the 
demand for exports). 
 210 Alex Altman, A Brief History of the Cigar, TIME (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/ 
article/0,8599,1869320,00.html. 
 211 Tanya Batallas, Competing Cohibas Eye End of Cuban Trade Embargo, STAR-LEDGER (June 24, 2009, 
7:04 AM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2009/06/competing_cohibas_eye_end_of_c.html. 
 212 Mohor, supra note 209, at 149. 
 213 Cohiba means “tobacco tree.” See Mohor, supra note 209, at 150. 
 214 Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 464 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
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registered the mark in 1992217 as the cigar market grew in popularity and the 
pent-up consumer demand for banned Cuban cigars among American cigar 
aficionados peaked.218  
When General Cigar began a marketing and advertising campaign in 1997 
in an attempt to draw further attention to the brand, Cubatabaco brought suit, 
claiming the Cuban trademark was “sufficiently well-known in the United 
States that it deserved protection under the so-called ‘famous marks 
doctrine.’”219 Although the district court found a likelihood of confusion 
existed between the Cuban mark and the General Cigar mark for Cohiba 
cigars,220 General Cigar relied on the embargo in its appeal to the Second 
Circuit in arguing that Cubatabaco could not prove that use of its mark existed 
within the United States.221 
1. The Second Circuit’s Ruling 
Although the district court originally sided with Cubatabaco and ordered 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to cancel General Cigar’s registration of 
the “Cohiba” mark, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling.222 
The Second Circuit did not focus on the well-known marks doctrine or on 
trademark law in general in examining the district court’s decision. Instead, the 
court relied on the U.S. embargo with Cuba and held that the case “implicates 
an issue of significant public concern—the United States’[s] national policy 
towards Cuba as established by the President and the Congress—and it 
involves a question of pure law.”223 The court reasoned that even if 
Cubatabaco acquired trademark rights in the United States for Cohiba cigars 
through the well-known marks doctrine, the Cuban company’s rights would be 
barred by the embargo.224 Accordingly, then, any discussion of the 
 
 217 Id. 
 218 See generally Joseph M. Perry et al., The Cuban Cigar Industry as the Transition Approaches, 8 CUBA 
TRANSITION 414 (1998), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/ca/cuba/asce/cuba8/42perry.pdf (“World-wide 
cigar production and consumption declined from a relative peak in the mid 1960s until the early 1990s. At that 
time, consumers rediscovered large, premium cigars. The demand for these high priced products began to 
increase . . . .”). 
 219 Empresa Cubana del Tabaco, 399 F.3d at 464. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 471. 
 224 Id. at 472 (“[W]e hold that the Embargo Regulations bar Cubatabaco’s acquisition of the U.S. 
COHIBA mark through the famous marks doctrine . . . .”). 
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applicability of the well-known marks doctrine became moot, because the 
court determined that the embargo’s regulations governed.225 
2. Embargo Trumps International Agreements, But For How Long? 
The Second Circuit’s ruling placed U.S. foreign policy ahead of 
international treaties and customary trademark law, and effectively stopped 
Cubatabaco from seeking to claim the trademark within the United States until 
after the embargo’s end. However, in December 2009, the parties returned to 
court for another hearing before a Southern District of New York judge.226 The 
court granted Cubatabaco’s motion for judgment on a state law claim of 
misappropriation, finding that Cubatabaco was entitled to a hearing on the 
issue of General Cigar’s bad faith.227 The court found that Cubatabaco was 
entitled to relief for General Cigar’s misappropriation of its mark, stating: 
[D]espite the fact that Cubatabaco is presently prohibited from selling 
its cigars in the United States due to the on-going embargo between 
this country and Cuba, Plaintiff has demonstrated that General 
Cigar’s continuing misappropriation of the goodwill associated with 
the COHIBA cigar is a wrongful act . . . . The mere fact that Plaintiff 
does not sell in the United States does not prevent the Court from 
granting an injunction where, as here, an ongoing misappropriation 
results in the continuing devaluation of Plaintiff’s product.228 
The Southern District of New York therefore granted Cubatabaco’s request 
for a permanent injunction blocking General Cigar from using the “Cohiba” 
trademark on its cigars.229 However, the court stayed all relief pending General 
Cigar’s appeal, after determining that General Cigar had demonstrated a 
“substantial possibility” of success on appeal to the Second Circuit.230 
Cubatabaco’s attorneys said the December 2009 ruling reinforced the 
“equitable principle that one company should not be able to profit from what it 
did not create.”231 However, the Second Circuit did not agree, as the appeals 
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court overturned the injunction barring General Cigar from using the Cohiba 
name in July 2010.232 The court determined that the Southern District of New 
York should not have reopened the case on the grounds of examining the bad 
faith of General Cigar.233 The ruling allowed General Cigar to continue selling 
cigars under the Cohiba name in the United States and caused Cubatabaco’s 
attorneys to examine the possibility of continuing the litigation before the 
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board.234 
Beyond the Second Circuit’s decision, the fact remains that General Cigar 
and other American cigar companies are paying close attention to a larger 
issue: what a potential end to the embargo would mean for their businesses. 
Even General Cigar’s own general counsel has commented that opening the 
U.S. market to Cuban cigars when the embargo ends could jeopardize his 
company’s bottom line.235 “The market is going to be turned upside down,” 
said Gerry Roerty, the general counsel for General Cigar.236 “[Americans] will 
buy a Donald Duck cigar if it’s a Cuban.”237 Similar to Bacardi’s lobbying 
effort in the Havana Club rum trademark dispute, General Cigar has spent $5 
million lobbying Congress to keep relevant trademark laws—and the embargo 
as a whole—in place.238 
III.  A SEPARATE STANDARD FOR CUBAN MARKS? 
Some commentators have argued that both the Havana Club rum and 
Cubatabaco cigar decisions have established a separate set of principles that 
govern trademark disputes with Cuba, because both court decisions relied on 
the statutory language authorizing the U.S. embargo with Cuba.239 The 1996 
Helms-Burton Act, Section 211, and the embargo itself effectively foreclose 
Cuban businesses from seeking intellectual property rights in the United States, 
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and have resulted in a “higher-standard” for Cuban entities.240 In light of 
substantial international opposition to the embargo, the question remains: 
should the U.S. Congress and federal courts continue to hold Cuban 
trademarks to a separate standard based on the embargo at the expense of 
customary international intellectual principles? 
A. Fight at the WTO: Does Section 211 Violate TRIPS? 
In particular, Section 211241 has provoked significant international 
opposition. The World Trade Organization received a complaint from the 
European Union in September 2000, which alleged that Section 211 violated 
the TRIPS trade agreement and requested a special WTO panel to investigate 
the issue.242 Because the United States and Cuba are both signatory states of 
TRIPS,243 the EU argued that Section 211 violated TRIPS Article 3(1), which 
states that each member state “shall accord to the nationals of other Members 
treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own nationals with regard to 
the protection of intellectual property.”244 Moreover, TRIPS also provides that 
whenever a trademark is duly registered in the country of origin, the other 
member countries of the WTO are obliged to accept and protect it.245 These 
principles led to the EU’s position that, in enacting Section 211, the United 
States discriminated against certain trademark owners of another member state, 
and therefore failed to support the agreement’s objective of developing a 
consistent enforcement mechanism for international intellectual property 
rights, in violation of the United States’s obligations under TRIPS.246 In 
response, the United States argued that TRIPS allows national law to 
determine trademark ownership, as individual states still retain the right to 
determine and recognize the owner of a trademark.247 
In ruling on the complaint filed by the EU, the Appellate Body of the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body determined that the trademark sanctions in 
Section 211 singled out Cuba for discriminatory treatment and therefore 
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violated TRIPS provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation 
status.248 According to the WTO, this discrimination denied Cuban trademark 
owners the chance to defend their rights in U.S. courts and therefore was 
inconsistent with the TRIPS agreement.249 
The WTO Appellate Body instructed the United States to bring itself back 
into compliance with TRIPS, or risk the possibility of trade sanctions for 
violating the agreement.250 However, the United States still had failed to 
comply by June 2010, causing the EU to note that the United States had made 
ninety-two presentations in the last decade on its plans to fix Section 211—
without actually complying.251 This lack of enforcement has angered Cuban 
leaders. In a November 2009 appearance before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body, one official accused the WTO of setting a negative precedent: “It has 
been more than seven years [since] the appellate body’s ruling . . . the parties 
that . . . demand other countries’ strict adherence to intellectual property  
rights . . . come to this body every month without even providing some 
information on how and when they will comply with recommendations.”252 
The United States continues to provide the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body 
with status updates on its efforts to comply with the Section 211 
recommendations, and the most recent report was presented on December 21, 
2009.253 After a U.S. official reported that Congress and President Obama’s 
administration are working to implement the recommendations, the EU noted 
that the United States was presenting its eighty-sixth status report on its plans 
to change Section 211 and that it “hoped that the new US authorities would 
take steps to finally implement the [Dispute Settlement Board’s] ruling and 
resolve the matter.”254 Furthermore, according to the summary of the meeting, 
“Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and 
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Paraguay all reiterated their continued concern over non-compliance.”255 
Therefore, while the United States does not face the immediate threat of 
retaliatory measures regarding its failure to fix Section 211, the international 
community is growing increasingly frustrated with the continual delays. 
B. Legislative Efforts to Fix Section 211 
Although there is no immediate pressure on the United States to revise 
Section 211 because of the EU’s decision to not press ahead with sanctions, 
two legislative proposals have been advocated to bring Section 211 into 
compliance with TRIPS and other international standards. The dueling 
approaches pit the prospect of a “narrow fix” against a full-fledged repeal of 
Section 211.256 Under the narrow fix approach, an amendment would tailor 
Section 211 to rid the act of the problematic discriminatory language.257 The 
amendment would change Section 211 to apply to all companies, even those 
based in the United States, instead of being limited to foreign businesses.258 
This slight change could perhaps solve the concern that Section 211 
discriminates against foreign businesses. Two bills proposed in the 111th 
Congress would incorporate this narrow change.259 The alternative proposal 
advocates for a full repeal of Section 211 as the best way to bring the United 
States into compliance with TRIPS.260 Both fixes have been discussed for 
years, and the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on whether to revise 
or altogether repeal Section 211 as recently as March 3, 2010.261 
With an outright repeal of Section 211, the United States could again prove 
that it honors its multilateral international agreements. Furthermore, the United 
States would set a precedent by showing other nations that different nations 
should honor each other’s trademarks—even if the two in question are not 
allies for other political reasons.262 Bill Reinsch, president of the National 
Foreign Trade Council, has called for a full repeal of Section 211 as a means of 
the United States reasserting itself as an international intellectual property 
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leader.263 In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Reinsch stated that the United States exports the most products, and therefore, 
has the most to lose if a weak international regime fails to protect trademark 
rights.264 “‘The U.S. has been the world leader in arguing for intellectual 
property . . . . [Section 211] has destroyed our moral authority.’”265 
Unlike its human rights abuses, Cuba’s actions in the intellectual property 
arena have not resulted in outrage from the international community. Cuba has 
consistently upheld trademark protections, despite tense political relationships 
with other nations. Trademarks from U.S. companies have long been honored 
in Cuba, and the Cuban government has refused to register marks that Cuban 
companies have applied for that serve as substantially similar versions of U.S. 
trademarks for Jell-O and Kraft, for example.266 Despite the embargo, more 
than five thousand U.S. trademarks have been registered in Cuba,267 as 
businesses want their mark protected from trademark pirates and anticipate the 
ability to do business in Cuba immediately following the embargo’s end.268 
Because the United States is the world’s intellectual property leader, the 
nation has the most to lose if other countries decide to violate established 
trademark practices. The Cuban government has upheld U.S. trademark 
protections in the past, causing the passage of Section 211 and the Second 
Circuit’s ruling in the Havana Club rum case to anger Fidel Castro. In a May 
1999 speech, Castro threatened to create a trademark for a Cuban version of 
Coke,269 which he viewed as an infringement of a U.S. trademark in the same 
way that U.S. companies are authorized to violate established Cuban 
trademarks such as Havana Club rum and Cohiba cigars.270 If the Cuban 
government halted the recognition of U.S. trademarks, Cuba could become a 
haven for trademark pirates who steal American marks. While Cubans argue 
that such a move would simply treat U.S. trademarks in the same way that the 
United States manages marks originating in Cuba, that type of reprisal would 
be devastating for U.S. businesses because of the substantial profit earned 
abroad from intellectual property exports. 
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Intellectual property exports play a prominent and increasingly significant 
role in the U.S. economy, as one trade organization estimated that U.S. 
intellectual property exports to foreign markets accounted for $126 billion in 
2007, an eight-percent jump in comparison to the previous year.271 Intellectual 
property foreign sales exceeded the foreign sales of other notable U.S. 
industries, such as aircraft, automobiles, and agricultural products.272 
Intellectual property-related industries, furthermore, accounted for 6.44% of 
the entire gross domestic product of the United States.273 Because intellectual 
property-related exports, and their corresponding trademarks, serve as such a 
vital part of the U.S. economy, the United States cannot afford to have its 
intellectual property threatened and subjected to reprisals. 
C. The Second Circuit’s Decisions on Cuban Trademarks Violate 
International Law Norms 
In both the Havana Club rum and Cohiba cigar cases, the Second Circuit 
reached decisions despite the fact that international law norms do not offer a 
set guideline for comparing treaties with domestic federal law. The U.S. 
Constitution authorizes the President to engage in treaties with the advice and 
consent of the U.S. Senate.274 However, the U.S. Constitution also states that 
federal statutes and international treaties are accorded equal standing and 
provides that federal courts have the power to decide cases arising under both 
federal law and international treaties.275 In addressing this issue of state 
sovereignty, there is no clear authority as to whether U.S. courts should adhere 
to the principles in international intellectual property agreements such as 
TRIPS, or whether federal laws passed in support of the embargo take 
precedence. 
1. Should the Last-in-Time Rule Still Apply? 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that the Constitution, 
federal law, and the treaties of the United States all are superior to laws passed 
by individual states; however, no specific priority is provided as to federal law 
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and treaties.276 Therefore, the Constitution itself does not directly guide courts 
as to whether an international treaty is superior to federal law.277 Because 
neither form of law is distinctly stated as supreme, customary international law 
has adopted a last-in-time rule where courts view treaties and federal law as 
equal and give controlling power to whichever is most recent,278 which allows 
Congress to pass a federal law, such as Section 211, that overrides a treaty. In 
the United States, courts use the last-in-time rule when federal statutes and 
international treaties oppose each other.279 Under this last-in-time approach, 
Section 211’s later passage would prevail over the TRIPS agreement and other 
international intellectual property treaties. Case law also supports the last-in-
time notion, finding that where a treaty and a later-enacted federal statute 
conflict, the later-enacted statute governs over the treaty, since the Constitution 
does not delineate an order of preference between treaties and federal 
statutes.280 
Some commentators, however, argue that the growth of international trade 
in recent decades has fostered a marked increase in multilateral treaties and 
other forms of international cooperation, which have helped to underscore the 
importance of a nation’s international reputation.281 The last-in-time rule, 
decided more than a century ago,282 would seem inconsistent and outdated in 
this new era. If a federal law permits Congress to modify and restrict a prior 
international treaty, the United States could be subject to a backlash from 
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scores of trading partners,283 and the nation’s leaders must weigh the potential 
impact of those reprisals against the desire to continue adhering to the last-in-
time principle. 
By overriding the Paris Convention and TRIPS in favor of strengthening 
the embargo with Cuba, the United States has ignored its obligations under 
international law, and in turn, has violated an agreement it previously ratified 
with more than one hundred other nations. Because international agreements 
have fundamentally changed since the era of the last-in-time rule’s adoption, 
this idea should not always govern when analyzing the interplay between a 
conflicting treaty and federal law. If the last-in-time norm were vacated in 
select instances, courts would not be bound to rule that Section 211 outranked 
the TRIPS agreement, and therefore, courts could incorporate longstanding 
intellectual property principles when making trademark dispute decisions. A 
nation’s leaders should use a balancing test in determining whether the 
reprisals that could come along with violating an international treaty justify the 
application of the last-in-time rule in giving precedence to a more recent 
federal statute instead of the treaty obligations. 
2. Does Section 211 Erode the United States’s International Standing? 
Since Fidel Castro’s ascension to power, U.S. policymakers have 
considered Cuba a strategic threat.284 However, no other countries observe the 
U.S. embargo with Cuba,285 and the UN General Assembly has voted to 
condemn the embargo by a substantial margin every year since 1992.286 At a 
time when the United States needs as many allies abroad as possible, some 
have argued that the United States has further isolated itself by deviating from 
international intellectual property principles in favor of upholding the Cuban 
embargo. In passing Section 211 in particular, Bill Reinsch of the National 
Foreign Trade Council argued that the United States has set a poor standard in 
telling the rest of the world that limiting trademark protection is appropriate 
based on solely political reasons.287 
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Section 211, in effect, we believe, tells the world that it is okay to 
limit trademark protection in certain obviously political 
circumstances. There are no doubt a lot of other countries who would 
welcome that message and would be happy to use it as an excuse to 
remove trademarks in situations that are politically important to them. 
This is not a message that we should be sending.288 
 Although this Comment is not calling for international agreements to 
invariably supersede federal law, given that fundamental issues of state 
sovereignty would be impacted by such an assertion, states should engage in a 
balancing test. In weighing the loss of reputation and prestige in the 
international intellectual property community versus the effect on national 
security in weakening the Cuban embargo, or at least allowing the country to 
have some level of trademark registration ability within the United States for 
its well-known marks, the United States has determined that federal law takes 
precedence over its international obligations. 
However, perhaps the United States can compromise in a way that allows 
for the condemnation of Cuba’s human rights record without sacrificing its 
international standing as an intellectual property leader. It is possible for the 
United States to repeal Section 211 without loosening the other restrictions 
inherent in the Cuba embargo. A full repeal of Section 211289—and not the 
narrow fix that would only rid Section 211 of its discriminatory language290—
would allow the United States to become fully compliant with the provisions in 
the TRIPS agreement, and show the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body that 
lawmakers have taken action to propose the changes requested in the appellate 
body’s ruling of more than seven years ago. The repeal of Section 211 would 
reestablish the same framework for the registration of foreign well-known 
marks that existed in the first four decades of the Cuban embargo. The Cuban 
government would possess the ability to register trademarks associated with 
nationalized businesses with the U.S. PTO, but only to the extent that those 
businesses would retain priority rights to the marks in a post-embargo 
marketplace. Because the embargo as a whole would still exist, no company 
associated with Cuba’s communist government would be able to sell its 
product within the United States; however, the companies would not lose their 
intellectual property rights to their well-known marks before the embargo is 
lifted. Furthermore, in conjunction with the repeal of Section 211, the United 
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States should strongly condemn Cuba’s recent human rights abuses, such as 
the continued imprisonment of political opponents291 and the hunger-strike 
death.292 An intellectual property compromise from the United States is not a 
carte blanche for Cuba to behave however it wants in the human rights arena, 
and the United States should make that clear. 
IV.  A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGISTRY FOR 
WELL-KNOWN MARKS 
Although a repeal of Section 211 would repair the United States’s 
international standing regarding its protection of well-known Cuban marks, it 
seems obvious that a similar dispute could arise between other nations with a 
deteriorating political relationship. To ensure that countries do not allow 
temporary political expediency to infringe on each other’s customary 
trademark rights, this Comment proposes the creation of an international 
registry for well-known marks as an amendment to TRIPS. This amendment 
for a well-known mark registry, if ratified by TRIPS’s signatory states, would 
serve as a more widespread solution in preventing countries from using 
political reasons as justification for interfering with intellectual property rights. 
A. Standardized Framework for Well-Known Marks 
First, to be considered for status as an internationally registered well-
known mark, a mark would have to meet a standardized definition of “well-
known” that would exist among all nations that have ratified the amendment. 
Both the WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the 
Protection of Well-Known Marks, and the European Union’s Community 
Trademark framework, provide guidance on how such a system should be 
developed. 
1. Advantages of Following the WIPO and EU Approaches 
The WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection 
of Well-Known Marks establishes a workable framework for determining 
which marks have achieved a sufficient level of fame to be characterized as 
“well-known.”293 Under this framework, an independent commission would 
first determine if the mark had established a degree of knowledge or 
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recognition in the relevant sector of the public.294 The well-known marks 
commission would be comprised of representatives from each state that had 
approved the amendment to TRIPS, and each state’s representative would 
serve on a rotating term so that the total number of commissioners would not 
be overly cumbersome at any given time.295 
In analyzing whether a mark conflicts with a separate, existing mark, the 
commission would use Article 4(1)(b) of the Joint Recommendation in its 
examination of whether the mark constitutes a reproduction or imitation of the 
well-known mark, and whether using the mark would likely unfairly impair or 
dilute the distinctive character of the well-known mark.296 Similarly to the 
EU’s trademark framework, once a mark were registered in one member state 
and achieved well-known status there, it would automatically achieve well-
known status in every country that had ratified the amended TRIPS 
agreement.297 
2. Applying Havana Club and Cohiba Marks to the Amended Framework 
Using Havana Club rum as an example, the commission could rule that the 
Cuban government’s joint venture with Pernod Ricard that expanded Havana 
Club’s sales and marketing to numerous countries caused the rum’s mark to 
achieve a high degree of knowledge or recognition. The relevant test would be 
to determine if worldwide consumers associated the mark with the specific rum 
exported from Cuba. The commissioners then would decide if another 
company aiming to use Havana Club as its trademark would dilute the 
character of the well-known mark because consumers would automatically 
associate the rum with its Cuban origins. If the commissioners opted to use the 
European Community Trademark System as a model, Havana Club rum would 
garner well-known status in all member states because Cuba is a signatory of 
TRIPS, and a well-known mark that exists in one member state would attain 
the same protections from all member states, even if the mark had yet to be 
used in commerce within every state’s borders. 
Similarly, with Cohiba cigars, the commission first would analyze if a 
relevant sector of the public associated the mark with its Cuban origins, or if 
the public instead believed that the mark had a stronger, non-Cuban tie to 
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General Cigar. If it was determined that the mark achieved its renown because 
of its association with Cuba, then commissioners would need to partake in a 
subsequent dilution analysis. The commissioners would decide if General 
Cigar’s use of the mark would impair the character of the well-known mark 
because consumers would be confused about the true origins of the cigars and 
possibly refrain from purchasing a cigar with questionable ties to Cuba. Again, 
if the commission used the European Community Trademark System as a 
guide, it is likely that Cohiba cigars would achieve well-known status in all 
member states that had ratified the amendment, because Cuba is a signatory of 
TRIPS, and TRIPS provides that a well-known mark existing in one member 
state would attain the same protections from all member states, even without 
use in commerce. 
Overall, because the public seeks Havana Club rum and Cohiba cigars 
primarily based on the Cuban origin of the products, it its likely that these 
marks would be construed as well known under an international registry and 
substantial weight would be given to the marks’ association with Cuba. In 
addition, the international registry amendment to TRIPS for well-known marks 
would mitigate consumer confusion in the worldwide marketplace, as only one 
company would be authorized as the well-known mark holder. A consumer 
looking to purchase Cohiba cigars in a country that trades with both the United 
States and Cuba would no longer be flummoxed by encountering both 
Cubatabaco’s and General Cigar’s mark. 
3. Should the Commissioners Use the EU Trademark Approach as a 
Guide? 
While the establishment of the Community Trademark system in the EU 
primarily has been viewed as a success,298 it is relevant to ask if a similar 
system could be duplicated worldwide, without some of the characteristics in 
place that make the EU so unique. Part Three of the European Community 
Treaty sets out the four freedoms that define the EU: free movement of goods, 
workers, establishment and the provision of services, and capital.299 These 
foundational principles are so vital to the EU that the European Court of 
Justice has noted that the fundamental interests of trademark protection must 
be reconciled “with those of free movement of goods and freedom to provide 
services in the common market in such a way that trade mark rights are able to 
 
 298 See supra Part I.B.3.b.i. 
 299 PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 605 (4th ed. 2008). 
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fulfil [sic] their essential role in the system of undistorted competition which 
the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain.”300 Therefore, the goal of 
harmonizing trademarks through the Community Trademark System as another 
means of coordinating European states as a single market for the free 
movement of goods certainly seems to align with the unified structure of the 
European Community. 
Despite the advantages inherent in the European Community’s different 
structure and in its profound emphasis on the free movement of goods, a cross-
border registry for well-known marks could succeed on a wider scale. 
Similarly to the European Community Treaty, the TRIPS Agreement itself is 
primarily concerned with enhancing trade among member states.301 In its 
preamble, TRIPS expresses the goal of member states to “reduce distortions 
and impediments to international trade . . . and to ensure that measures and 
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade.”302 Therefore, while all of the signatory states of 
TRIPS may not function as one cohesive “community,” as is the case in the 
EU, all of the signatory states have expressed a desire to tear down trade 
barriers. Accordingly, the proposed TRIPS amendment that this Comment 
advocates seemingly would provide for a more seamless and efficient 
registration system for marks that have achieved such renown that they are 
well known across borders. 
While the suggestion of an international registry for well-known marks as 
an amendment to TRIPS seems easy, the real question remains whether 
countries have an incentive to sign on to the amended agreement and sacrifice 
some of their intellectual-property autonomy. The United States, as the country 
that stands to lose the most if international intellectual property standards are 
violated, would need to be persuaded that such an amendment would primarily 
serve to protect its thousands of well-known marks, such as those of Nike, 
Starbucks, McDonalds, and others, and that such protection is worth a loss of 
sovereignty. Perhaps a reminder of the problems that the United States 
encountered in South Africa would persuade lawmakers of the benefits of 
signing on to such an amendment. During the U.S. embargo with South Africa 
as a protest of the county’s apartheid regime, U.S. companies were prevented 
 
 300 Case C-63/97, Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW) and BMW Nederland BV v. Ronald Karel 
Deenik, 1999 E.C.R. I-947, ¶ 62. 
 301 See TRIPS, supra note 19, pmbl. 
 302 Id. 
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from filing trademark applications in South Africa.303 When the embargo 
ended, scores of U.S. companies discovered that their well-known marks had 
been appropriated by South African companies who registered the marks as a 
means of profiting from the U.S. businesses’ reputations.304 The expense that it 
took for the U.S. companies to recover their marks in South Africa could have 
been avoided if an international registry for well-known marks existed that 
superseded temporary political considerations, embargoes, or other forms of 
disputes between countries. 
B. An International Registry: Promoting “Clean Hands” in Trademark 
Disputes 
The amendment calling for the creation of the international registry for 
well-known marks would help emphasize the “unclean hands” doctrine in 
international trademark jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined 
unclean hands as “any willful act concerning the cause of action which 
rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct.”305 In 
applying for trademarks for Bacardi’s version of Havana Club rum and 
General Cigar’s Cohiba cigars with the knowledge that Cuban products 
bearing the marks would have been able to enter into the U.S. market if not for 
the embargo, both Bacardi and General Cigar can be said to have acted with 
unclean hands. An international registry for well-known marks would forbid 
these companies from using an embargo or other temporary domestic law or 
resolution as a means of circumventing traditional intellectual property 
principles and agreements. 
Courts do not traditionally analyze instances of good faith or bad faith 
when ruling on trademark disputes.306 In light of the behavior exhibited by 
several U.S. companies in relying on the embargo and appropriating the well-
known marks of Cuban entities, the time has come for “bad faith” to earn a 
more prominent place in trademark jurisprudence. The European Court of 
Justice recently clarified the meaning of bad faith in EU trademark law.307 The 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) established a three-part test for bad faith in 
 
 303 See Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 6 (testimony of William R. Reinsch). 
 304 See id. (listing Burger King, Toys “R” Us, and Victoria’s Secret as some of the affected companies). 
 305 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945). 
 306 See Stephanie Bodoni, Lindt Bunny Rivals Must Show Bad Faith, EU Court Says, BLOOMBERG (June 
11, 2009, 11:25 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=afcUz6AUrtic; supra Part 
I.B.3.a. 
 307 Charles Forelle, For Chocolate Bunny, It’s Still Legal Limbo, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2009, at B8. 
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a case involving Lindt, a Swiss chocolatier which secured a Community 
Trademark in 2000 for the shape of its gold-wrapped chocolate bunny, and 
Hauswirth, an Austrian competitor that had sold its own similar chocolate 
bunny since 1962.308 Although Lindt originally sued Hauswirth for infringing 
its trademark, Hauswirth responded with a countersuit that claimed Lindt’s 
trademark was filed in bad faith, as the company knew about Hauswirth’s 
more-than-five decades of use, and the trademark therefore should have been 
deemed invalid.309 According to the ECJ’s ruling, for bad faith to exist in the 
filing of a trademark, the trademark applicant must know that the mark it seeks 
to protect already exists in the marketplace, the applicant must apply for the 
trademark with the intent of blocking its rival, and the product must have other 
legal protections.310 However, the ECJ also held that, in addition to the 
multifactor test, an assessment of bad faith depends on the specific 
circumstances of each case.311 The case has been remanded to the Austrian 
court of first instance, where Lindt has been asked to supply evidence showing 
how well known their chocolate bunnies were among relevant consumers in 
the marketplace in 2000, and lawyers do not expect a decision in the case 
before 2012.312 Hauswirth, the Austrian chocolate bunny maker, believes the 
ECJ’s decision means it can prove Lindt’s bad faith by showing that the Swiss 
chocolatier should have known about Hauswirth’s existence when it filed a 
trademark application; however, it seems as though the ECJ’s ruling calls for a 
wider analysis of the facts of each case in determining whether a trademark can 
be invalidated due to bad faith.313 
If U.S. courts had adopted the ECJ’s multifactor framework for bad faith 
alone, without also analyzing the specific circumstances of each case, Bacardi 
and General Cigar would have violated the principle. Both companies knew 
that the products existed in Cuba when they filed a trademark application in the 
United States, but they proceeded with the hopes of establishing the rights to 
the products in the United States and blocking the Cuban entities from ever 
using their trademarks in the United States. This behavior seems to reflect the 
 
 308 Case C-529/07, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli v. Franz Hauswirth, 2009 E.C.R. I-04893; see 
Bodoni, supra note 306.  
 309 See Forelle, supra note 307. 
 310 See id. 
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 313 See Bodoni, supra note 306 (quoting Alexander Tsoutsanis, an intellectual property lawyer at DLA 
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core tenet of bad faith, and it also could lead to a strong likelihood of consumer 
confusion in having the same mark represent different products worldwide. 
With a binding international registry for well-known marks and a U.S. 
court system that relied on equitable principles of international intellectual 
property rights, including the consideration of unclean hands and bad faith, a 
future embargo that mirrors the current U.S.-Cuba trade restrictions would not 
lead to a similar impact on trademark rights between the two nations at the 
center of the conflict. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the 1883 enactment of the Paris Convention,314 countries have 
realized that the importance of preventing consumer confusion in a worldwide 
marketplace means that trademark law’s focus on territoriality must be subject 
to certain exceptions. The signatory states of the Paris Convention and 
TRIPS315 are supposed to subscribe to the belief that marks that have achieved 
well-known status should receive heightened protection against imitations, 
even if the original marks have not been used in commerce in every signatory 
state. The policies inherent to these agreements seem uncontroversial when all 
signatory states cooperate as allies, but trouble exists when nations fall out of 
line. 
A dictator who illegally confiscates the property of his people, jails 
dissenters on vague charges, and even allows prisoners to die by not 
intervening in hunger strikes should not be embraced in the United States or in 
the worldwide community of nations. However, this Comment contends that 
the United States can punish Cuba’s transgressions without impacting the 
arena of international intellectual property rights, primarily by maintaining the 
embargo as punishment for Cuba’s human rights abuses while repealing the 
controversial Section 211. The United States, as the world’s largest exporter of 
intellectual property—and especially of well-known trademarks—must tread 
carefully in approving laws such as Section 211 that violate intellectual 
property treaties and call for discriminatory treatment of one country. United 
States lawmakers must determine if continuing to punish Cuba’s communist 
government by prohibiting the registration of marks such as those of Havana 
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Club rum and Cohiba cigars is worth the risk of the example that such actions 
set for the rest of the world.316 
Still, lawmakers face a difficult balancing act, and the influx of lobbyists 
and special interest groups can easily sway views.317 Because no simple 
solution exists in the conundrum of whether to recognize well-known 
trademarks emanating from a rogue state, this Comment pushes for the 
creation of a permanent, higher power that would take the decision out of the 
hands of individual nations and instead rely on a separate international 
framework existing in times of war and in times of peace. The nations that 
adopted the TRIPS Agreement have recognized the need for common 
international trade rules for intellectual property rights. An amendment 
creating an international registry for the controversial trademark area of well-
known marks would further the overall mission of TRIPS by targeting—and 
restricting—the enhanced potential for consumer confusion that now exists in a 
marketplace that has expanded to a worldwide reach. 
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